Since the historic SADC-EAC meeting on February 8, 2025, followed by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) on February 14, 2025, there has been optimism that a solution to the ongoing DR Congo crisis will be reached. However, since these meetings, the situation has deteriorated, with M23 capturing more territory, including Bukavu, the second-largest city in Eastern Congo. The continued advance of M23 has forced thousands to flee to neighboring Burundi.
This escalation has caused disillusionment within the DR Congo government regarding the process. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference, DR Congo President Felix Tshisekedi expressed little optimism about the impact of the African-led process. He also criticized the three African members (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia) of the UN Security Council for blocking a resolution that named Rwanda as a supporter of M23 in DRC.
“There are talks about unity of the African continent, solidarity, and fraternity all day, but when it comes to concrete realities, we are not able to uphold these principles. That is the problem with multilateralism in Africa, and that is a big issue that affects the credibility of our organizations,” Tshisekedi argued.
As the first step of the African-led, SADC-EAC initiative was awaited, the UN Security Council issued a strongly worded resolution on February 21, 2025. The resolution called on the Rwanda Defence Forces to stop supporting M23 and to immediately withdraw from Congolese territory without preconditions.
This was a diplomatic victory for Tshisekedi, a victory that African-led processes couldn’t provide, he seized the moment by convening a meeting of the ruling coalition, the Sacred Union, on February 22, 2025. Among other discussions, he emphasized his stance against engaging with M23 while also working to form a new government of national unity to address emerging challenges.
While the crucial EAC-SADC meeting for Chiefs of the Defense Forces remained in the pipeline, there were more developments in the international arena. In addition to the UN resolution, diplomatic pressure on Rwanda increased. This included sanctions by U.S. treasury on Rwanda’s Minister of State for Regional Integration, James Kabarebe, and M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka Kingston on February 20, 2025.
Furthermore, on February 24, 2025, the EU issued a statement halting defense consultations with Rwanda. However, the statement fell short of the EU Parliament’s proposals, which included halting the mineral deal with Rwanda and imposing additional sanctions. Reports indicated that a working group of EU diplomats had prepared individual sanctions against ten Rwandan officers and M23 actors, but these sanctions were blocked by Luxembourg’s Minister, Xavier Bettel, prompting the DRC Minister of Foreign Affairs to engage in a phone call with him on February 25, 2025.
The UK also announced several sanctions on Rwanda, including ceasing high-level attendance at events hosted by the Rwandan government, limiting trade promotion activities with Rwanda, pausing direct bilateral financial aid, suspending future defense training assistance, reviewing export licenses for the Rwanda Defence Force, and coordinating with partners on potential new sanctions.
While DR Congo has received positively these actions taken by international communities, Rwanda has criticized these international measures as interference in the African-led process.
“Punitive measures, including sanctions, make no contribution toward long-term security, peace, and stability for all the countries of the Great Lakes region,” Rwanda stated in a statement issued by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on February 20, 2025. “Such measures can only be construed as unwarranted external interference in the African-led process, which risks prolonging the resolution of the conflict,” the statement emphasized.
Meanwhile, the first crucial step of the SADC-EAC process, the joint meeting of the Chiefs of Defense Forces, was finally held on February 24, 2025. The February 8th EAC-SADC resolution had set the meeting to be held within five days.
Additionally, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe were appointed as facilitators of the EAC-SADC peace process. The date for the joint ministerial meeting was also announced, set for February 28, 2025.
Analyzing the timing of the EAC-SADC process, Dr. Petro Protas, an International Law Expert from the University of Dar es Salaam, highlights that the process operates on a 30-day timeline. While not explicitly stated, this timeline is a key component of the process design.
“The summit provided thirty days for the resolution’s implementation. This can be seen by looking at the resolution text, which sets that the joint meeting of ministers will be held within 30 days. Among other things, this meeting will deliberate on the report of the joint meeting of Chiefs of Defense Forces and establish a secretariat to monitor the implementation of the summit’s decisions,” Dr. Protas underscored. There is also a major pending issue that remains for the implementation of the EAC-SADC initiatives, the financial aspect, which is expected to be concluded at the ministerial meeting.
The structure of this process, compared to the rapidly changing situation on the ground, has placed the African-led initiative in a catch-up position.
Furthermore, divided priorities among key stakeholders present another challenge. For example, ahead of the EAC-SADC Chiefs of Defense meeting, Uganda’s Chief of Defense, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, threatened to attack Bunia, a city in Eastern DRC, on the same day that M23 completed its capture of Bukavu. Additionally, the fate of the SAMIDRC mission remains uncertain, with Rwanda continuing to criticize the initiative, particularly targeting South Africa.
READ: Rwanda and M23 Attacks in DRC Deepen Mistrust in EAC, Cause Confusion in SADC. Can Tanzania Do More?
These divided priorities make it difficult for the African-led process to enforce its agreements effectively. With no practical enforcement mechanisms in place, even when agreements are ignored, the African-led process can only rely on the goodwill and cooperation of the responsible actors.
Since the crisis escalated, the DRC government has focused heavily on securing international support outside of Africa. In what appears to be a hedge against the uncertain outcomes of the African-led process and to mitigate external global pressure, President Tshisekedi has invited U.S. and European companies to secure key strategic minerals from DRC rather than sourcing “looted” minerals.
At present, the African-led process appears to be playing catch-up with events on the ground and has limited impact on some of the most difficult issues in DRC, such as the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty versus the presence of Rwandan forces in DR Congo, or Rwanda’s security concerns regarding the FDLR rebel group.
There is also no clear path forward regarding the M23’s establishment of a parallel government in captured territories, which the UN Security Council resolution has denounced. With the DRC government refusing direct dialogue with M23, questions remain about the fate of these areas and the possibility of a ceasefire.
Many are watching closely to see the developments in the coming days, particularly the joint ministerial meeting, to determine how the EAC-SADC process will chart its course in addressing the crisis.
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This article is very informative and well written