Justice, News, Politics

Lissu Says Treason Case Rests on Police Inference as Final Submission Continues

The defence argues that the alleged words are neither treason nor another criminal offence, and that spoken words cannot amount to an overt act under the charge.

The Chanzo Reporter

September 25, 2026

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Dar es Salaam — Tundu Lissu on Thursday argued that the prosecution’s treason case rests on an unsupported police interpretation of his April 3, 2025 speech, rather than evidence that he intended to intimidate the government or commit an offence recognised by law. His final submission will continue on Friday, September 25.

Lissu told the three-judge High Court panel that only four of the prosecution’s 17 witnesses gave evidence on the alleged intention to mobilise the public to obstruct the 2025 general election.

He said three of those four were police officers who had not attended the April meeting, while the fourth, identified in the proceedings as PW17, was the sole eyewitness and journalist who had attended and broadcast it.

According to Lissu, the three police witnesses, George Bagyemu, John Kaaya and ACP Amin Mahamba, inferred an intention to threaten the executive because an election is held under the Constitution and laws enforced by the government. He said none of the words in the charge expressly mentioned the government, a state organ or an official.

“The whole case is built on their feelings, suppositions and suspicions, not on evidence,” Lissu told the court.

The prosecution has not yet responded to Lissu’s final submission, and the court made no ruling on the arguments on Thursday.

Wording of indictment

Before addressing the witness evidence, Lissu returned to his argument that the information – the formal written accusation – is defective because it alleges that he sought to incite “the public” without identifying the people said to have been targeted. He argued that the charge also introduced an alleged purpose of stopping an election that is not contained in the treason provision relied upon.

He referred to a High Court ruling in the case of Freeman Mbowe which, he said, held that criminal laws must give fair notice and protect people from arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

Lissu cited the decision’s conclusion that a failure to identify the lawful authority targeted by alleged utterances had prejudiced the accused and made the charge defective.

“‘The public’ includes everyone in mainland Tanzania,” Lissu said. “If it is not particularised, there is no way for an accused person to defend himself.”

Lissu said the information in his case used a term that does not appear in Section 39(2)(d), which refers to a person or group of persons. The court did not rule on that submission either.

Contrasting police account

Lissu submitted that PW17’s account did not support the police theory. He said the witness described the meeting as one convened for CHADEMA aspirants to discuss election matters and the party’s No Reforms, No Election policy.

Lissu said PW17’s statement, which he referred to as Exhibit D16, did not describe the alleged words as treasonous or criminal. He also told the court that PW17 said it was not wrong for party leaders to discuss their no-reforms policy and electoral challenges in their constituencies.

“He was there, he saw, he listened, and he broadcast the meeting,” Lissu told the court. “He said he did not see treason.”

Lissu argued that the difference between the account of the eyewitness and those of the police officers made the prosecution’s evidence unreliable. He said the police testimony proceeded from a belief that disrupting an election necessarily meant threatening the executive, and challenged the premise that the executive alone enforces all laws.

He cited laws governing the judiciary, Parliament, the electoral commission and the Tanganyika Law Society as examples of laws administered by institutions other than the executive.

“Suspicion, however strong, cannot be the basis of a conviction in a criminal charge,” Lissu said.

‘Words disclose no offence’

Lissu further submitted that the words cited in the information, including phrases translated as “we will stop the election,” “we will disrupt the election” and “we will mobilise rebellion,” do not fall within the treason acts set out in Section 39 of the Penal Code.

He listed the forms of treason he said are set out in that provision, including conduct directed at the President, the overthrow of government, intimidation of the executive, Parliament or the judiciary, and acts involving enemies of the state or armed force. He argued that the alleged words did not fit any of those categories.

Lissu also referred the court to the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors’ Elections Act, 2024. He said its offences and penalties provisions do not criminalise the alleged conduct described in the charge.

“If an act, attempt or omission is not punishable by law, it is not an offence,” Lissu said.

He submitted that the prosecution had not defined what the expressions “disrupt the election,” “stop the election,” “mobilise rebellion” or “cause chaos” meant, or explained why they allegedly constituted criminal conduct. He said the burden of doing so remained with the prosecution and did not shift to the accused.

‘Deed of uttering’

Lissu then addressed the wording in the information that he had manifested a treasonous intention through his “deed of uttering” the alleged words. He argued that the prosecution had deliberately treated spoken words as a deed to meet a statutory requirement for an overt act, deed, printing or writing.

“Words cannot be deeds,” Lissu clarified, citing dictionary definitions of “act” and “deed” in support of his submission that both refer to something done, rather than something said.

Lissu argued that the use of “uttering” also rendered the information defective because the term, as defined in the Penal Code, relates to forgery and counterfeit documents or coins, not the treason provision relied upon by the prosecution.

He cited Court of Appeal authorities in support of his argument that an information introducing matters alien to the law creates an incurably defective charge.

He invited the judges to answer the fifth issue in his favour, namely that the alleged words did not constitute an overt act or deed under Section 39(2)(d) of the Penal Code.

Justice Dunstan Ndunguru directed Lissu to begin his sixth issue on Friday so that the argument could proceed in an orderly way. The prosecution, through State Attorney Katuga, agreed. The court adjourned until 9 a.m. on September 25.

The matter is at the final-submissions stage. Lissu began his closing argument on September 23, after the court had declared the defence case closed the previous week.