Between 2020 and 2021, the security situation in Tanzania’s four southern regions—Lindi, Mtwara, Pwani, and Ruvuma—was considered fluid and unpredictable.
Although law enforcement agencies had made significant progress in suppressing killings in Pwani (Rufiji, Kibiti and Mkuranga), they also knew that the majority of the criminals had fled further south and sheltered with relatives or sympathisers.
Notably, despite his tough demeanour, the late President John Pombe Magufuli did not include the southern corridor in his 2020 re-election campaign schedule. After all, there had been a serious cross-border attack just a month before the 2020 general election. Given the need for caution, no presidential-level visit happened until three years later.
President Samia Suluhu Hassan spent more than a week in the two regions of Ruvuma and Mtwara in September. Prior to the September trip, the President had visited Lindi and Pwani regions exactly a year earlier, i.e., 2023.
If anything, recent presidential visits to the two southernmost regions of Ruvuma and Mtwara suggest a return to a level of stability that was last seen a decade ago. A series of criminal events that had beset the country since 2012 coalesced into a clear pattern in 2014.
In a sense, 2024 marks ten years since terrorist cells that had found space for incubation in the Pwani region unmasked themselves. It all started with the targeted killing of ruling party cadres and local government officials and later evolved to include intense firefights and targeted ambushes against the police.
Apart from President Samia’s visit in September, there are other signs that the Tanzanian authorities are confident in the security situation. Key crossing points into Mozambique, such as Mtambaswala and Kalambo, have continued to operate after re-opening more than a year ago.
READ MORE: Tanzania Weighs Its Options as SADC Troops Leave Mozambique
However, movement across the Kitaya border crossing (in Mtwara rural) remains restricted, and a semi-official curfew is exercised there. Night-time buses continue to operate along the southern corridor, from Pwani to Ruvuma, just like any other part of the country.
As expected, the ending of the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in July coincided with heightened security across the corridor. However, there is no indication that the withdrawal has had a noticeable negative effect on the security situation in Tanzania.
As a sign of stability on the Tanzanian side, there is an uptick in local-level business activity into the country through formal and informal crossing points. Dry fish, clothes, timber and other products from Mozambique have re-appeared in various markets in Mtwara.
This local-level trend seems to point to a general uptick in business activity between the two countries. According to Bank of Tanzania (BoT) records, exports to Mozambique slumped significantly in 2020 and 2021 and significantly increased in 2022 (see table).
The overall export records for 2022 indicate a full recovery, slightly exceeding the 2019 performance. Although a significant share of cross-border business along the southern corridor is informal and small-scale, it is useful in gauging the direction of the security situation.
Notable developments
If one examines the geography of violent conflict in Tanzania over the last ten years, the southern part of the country stands out for two notable developments: the natural-gas-related riots in Mtwara (December 2012 – January 2013) and the terrorist insurgency in Pwani region (2014-2018).
These two developments took place in regions known for high marginalisation sentiments. In both cases, the Police Force lost control and had to be assisted by the Tanzania Peoples Defence Force (TPDF).
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Unlike the gas riots, which were spontaneous and caught authorities off-guard, the insurgency in Pwani developed over time, with authorities missing or ignoring vital signs. Research on what went wrong has identified failures in early warning mechanisms, but no critical analysis of the government’s response has been undertaken.
Although Tanzania has succeeded in suppressing a terrorist insurgency on its own territory and performed well in containing the risk of spillover from Mozambique, there is still a reason to worry.
Firstly, there is no indication that the government of Mozambique is on track to adopt the comprehensive approach needed to address the problem successfully. So far, the military campaign against the Islamic State in Mozambique (ISM) rests largely on foreigners’ hands, and a political channel remains underexplored.
Besides, an ongoing post-election dispute has not helped the situation, which complicates the entire picture.
Marginalisation sentiments
Secondly, as noted earlier, there are strong sentiments of marginalisation among the residents of Lindi and Mtwara. I still remember the example of an old man who, a few years ago, complained to researchers about the time it took to tarmac the Dar-Lindi road and claimed if it were elsewhere in the country, it would have been completed earlier.
The sentiments underscore inhabitants’ knowledge of their regions’ position on the country’s poverty map. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, the three regions along the southern corridor—Ruvuma, Lindi, and Mtwara—stand out for higher rates of basic food poverty (see map). The gradual pace of change in this part of the country explains both the persistence of poverty and the proclivity to conflict.
Percentage of population below food and basic needs poverty lines by region (Tanzania mainland)
Tanzanian authorities have anchored their solution to poverty in the southern regions on the Mtwara development corridor plan. This development plan envisions revitalising the local economy through a functioning deep-sea harbour, a modern railway network, better road infrastructure, and adequate (national-grid) electricity.
If successfully implemented, this vision will most likely be transformative. However, it is an ambitious and long-term plan that relies on support from financial markets.
The conflict in Mozambique increases political risk for potential Mtwara corridor investors and undermines the neighbouring country’s ability to participate in the initiative. The viability of such a sizable investment depends, in part, on the participation of other countries in the region.
Overlooking the risks
Most analysts who have examined Tanzania’s Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project in the Lindi region have concentrated on its potential for economic transformation and overlooked the associated risk of conflict. Notably, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado has totally paralysed Total’s LNG project in Mozambique.
If implemented, the Tanzania LNG project will be the largest in the country’s history. Tanzania has pushed for an on-shore liquefaction facility to attract associated industries and broaden the scope of its citizens’ participation. Moreover, a comprehensive local content regime is now at the stakeholder consultation stage.
Undoubtedly, the LNG project will most likely bolster the viability of the Mtwara development corridor. However, Lindi, the host region, and its neighbours have a limited skilled population. This reality will limit the inhabitants’ ability to seize lucrative opportunities from the LNG project and other commercial initiatives.
In this sense, there is a real possibility that exclusion concerns will exacerbate marginalisation sentiments and could contribute to a recurrence of violent conflict in future. To mitigate this risk, responsible authorities can review the legal framework for petroleum management and expand the avenues for local communities to benefit.
Service levy and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) payments will not be sufficient to offset a sense of losing out triggered by the LNG rush. Unfortunately, this idea has been rejected before, but perhaps the time has come for it to be considered. Stability along the southern corridor needs to be anchored on strong security measures and robust community development initiatives.
Dastan Kweka is a governance specialist, analyst and writer. He’s available at kwekad@gmail.com or on X as @KwekaKweka. Do you want to publish in this space? Contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com for further inquiries.
