The recent Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda is a serious reminder that Tanzania’s health security cannot depend on statements alone.
It must be built on early warning, transparent communication, equipped frontline workers, working laboratories, community trust, and appropriately financed emergency response systems.
According to recent official statements, surveillance and traveller screening have been strengthened at border points, technical guidelines have been shared with regional authorities, high-risk regions have been assessed, isolation rooms have been prepared in health facilities, and a mobile laboratory has been positioned in Kagera Region.
These announcements suggest action. But the question remains: are the measures taken enough to protect Tanzanians? On this question, the government’s response still falls short in several critical areas.
Shortcomings
First, public communication has not been strong enough. Ebola preparedness depends heavily on public awareness. Tanzanians must know the symptoms, where to report suspected cases, what to avoid, and why early reporting saves lives.
Information should be reaching people in simple Kiswahili through radio, community health workers, religious leaders, local government leaders, schools, markets, bus stands, ports, and border communities.
A few official statements are not enough. The government must ensure that every Tanzanian in high-risk areas understands Ebola’s symptoms and knows exactly where to report suspected cases. Without this knowledge, cases will be missed, and the virus will spread silently through communities.
Second, preparedness must go beyond border screening. Ebola can enter the country through formal and informal routes, through travellers, health facilities, transport corridors, and community movement.
The East African Community has urged partner states to strengthen surveillance, laboratory diagnosis, infection prevention and control, risk communication, community engagement, and cross-border coordination.
Tanzania must demonstrate clearly how these systems are functioning in every high-risk region, not only at major entry points.
Border screening catches some cases. But it catches only those who pass through official checkpoints. The virus can travel through informal routes, through communities with high cross-border movement, through fishing communities, through transport hubs, and through refugee-hosting areas.
These areas need surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, and community awareness just as much as formal border posts.
Protecting frontline workers
Third, frontline health workers need stronger protection. Ebola outbreaks often expose weaknesses in infection prevention and control, especially in primary healthcare.
READ MORE: Tanzania Declares End of Marburg Virus Disease in Kagera
WHO has reported health worker infections in the current DRC outbreak, showing how dangerous this disease is for doctors, nurses, laboratory staff, ambulance teams, cleaners, and community health workers.
The government should publicly reassure health workers that adequate personal protective equipment (PPE), training, risk allowances, reporting channels, and psychosocial support are in place. Without this reassurance, health workers will hesitate to treat suspected cases, and the outbreak will spread unchecked through communities.
Fourth, the government has not been transparent enough about readiness gaps. Preparedness is not proven by saying “We are ready.”
It is proven by publishing practical information: which regions are high-risk, how many rapid response teams are active, how many isolation beds are functional, whether PPE stocks are adequate, whether ambulance referral systems are ready, and whether district health teams have received emergency funds.
Tanzanians deserve facts, not general assurances. Transparency about gaps is not weakness—it is the foundation of trust. When the government acknowledges what still needs to be done, communities know the government is serious about protection. When the government only announces successes, communities wonder what is being hidden.
READ MORE: Government Calls on Diaspora to Strengthen National Health Services
Fifth, community engagement remains too weak. In Kagera, authorities have called for heightened vigilance, noting border entry points such as Mutukula, Kabanga, Murusagamba, and Rusumo, and emphasising the role of village monitoring teams and community health workers.
This is good, but it must be scaled up nationally, especially in transport hubs, fishing communities, border markets, refugee-hosting areas, and regions with high cross-border movement.
Community health workers, village leaders, religious leaders, and market traders are the first line of defence against Ebola. These people must be trained, equipped, and empowered to identify suspected cases and report them immediately. Without this community-level engagement, the outbreak will spread before formal health systems can respond.
Serious situation
The current regional situation is serious. WHO reported that by 29 May 2026, there were confirmed cases across DRC and Uganda, with deaths among confirmed cases and hundreds of suspected cases in DRC. WHO also assessed the regional risk as high. Tanzania cannot afford a slow, underfunded, or overly centralised response. This is what we expect the government to do immediately:
First, release a national Ebola preparedness update every week, including risks, actions taken, gaps, and public advice. Second, provide emergency funds directly to high-risk regions and districts, especially those bordering Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC-linked routes, and Lake Victoria transport corridors.
READ MORE: Visas Are the New Shackles: How the West Bleeds Africa Dry of Its Best Minds
Third, train and equip all frontline health workers, not only those at border posts. Fourth, strengthen community awareness in Kiswahili and local languages, using radio, village leaders, religious leaders, schools, markets, and transport stations.
Fifth, ensure all suspected-case referral pathways are functional, including ambulances, isolation spaces, sample transport, and laboratory turnaround. Sixth, work closely with the EAC, WHO, Africa CDC and neighbouring countries for real-time information sharing and coordinated cross-border response.
This is not a moment for panic. But it is also not a moment for complacency. Tanzania has experience with epidemic threats, including COVID-19, Marburg, cholera, and other public health emergencies.
The lesson is clear: delays cost lives, secrecy damages trust, and underprepared health systems—especially primary health systems with empowered communities, village dispensaries, and ward-level health centres—expose citizens and health workers to avoidable danger.
The government must act with urgency, transparency, and accountability. Tanzanians do not need political slogans. They need a health system that is ready. Preparedness is not an announcement. Preparedness is protection.
Dr Elizabeth Benedict is a public health and health management specialist and health sector spokesperson for the ACT Wazalendo party. She can be reached at elizabethbenedict2013@gmail.com or on X as @DrBSanga. The opinions expressed here are the writer’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of The Chanzo. If you are interested in publishing in this space, please contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com.
