The Southern African Development Community (SADC) met last week, March 13, 2025, and decided to terminate the mandate of its Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMI-DRC). Deployed in December 2023, SAMI-DRC had a peace enforcement mandate and replaced the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). The EACRF had been forced to withdraw barely a year after deployment due to a dispute over its mandate.
The announcement of SAMI-DRC’s termination did not point to a specific reason. It seems two main factors influenced the decision. Firstly, a realisation that the mission’s mandate had become unattainable due to encirclement and confinement of its troops in various bases. Secondly, the undeniable reality that the DRC lacks a fighting force that could, with minimal support, reverse the gains made by the M23 rebels and their backers.
There is no doubt that the SAMI-DRC has met a humiliating end. The rhetoric is that the coalition in which it was part of was defeated in the battlefield. After the fall of Goma in January, a campaign to humiliate SAMI-DRC forces involved sensational reporting on pregnant South African soldiers, images of SADC troops raising a white flag, and a viral video of an alleged Tanzanian military officer emptying his pockets before possibly crossing a border. The campaign pushed for the withdrawal of SAMI-DRC, and has finally succeeded.
SADC has tried to save face by reiterating a commitment to its Mutual Defence Pact, and implying its willingness to field another peace enforcement operation if the situation in DRC calls for it. It’s hard to see how this promise shields the image of a mission forced to withdraw at a time when the humanitarian crisis remains dire. Nonetheless, domestic politics within Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) made the mission unsustainable. South Africa, the largest contributor, came under internal pressure to withdraw its contingent, while Malawi announced its intention soon after the fall of Goma.
So, what do we know about how Tanzania has reacted to humiliation before, and how might the DRC experience affect its positioning?
READ MORE: Tanzania Stabilises Its Southern Border, Even As Mozambique Struggles
Humiliation has repeatedly catalysed major adjustments in Tanzania’s security policy. An army mutiny paralyzed the government in January 1964, compelling the embarrassed Nyerere to turn to British forces for rescue. This incident led to a decision to disband Tanganyika Rifles and form the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF). The invasion and seizure of the Kagera salient by Idi Amin’s forces in 1978 resulted in a full-scale war, and a major re-organisation of the TPDF after the war. A former secretary general of the ruling party told me recently that Tanzania would have come across as ‘impotent’ had it failed to discipline Idi Amin.
The humiliation of SAMI-DRC will inevitably spur a shift in Tanzania’s approach to peace enforcement operations. Token deployments to Mozambique and DRC have exposed the TPDF to risks that need to be re-examined. For instance, SAMI-DRC was not fully-complemented and remained under-equipped even as enemy manoeuvres intensified. It is also clear that a limited TPDF posture in Mozambique has allowed new actors to undercut Tanzania’s influence.
It took Tanzania more than two decades (1980 -2000) to recover from a costly intervention in Uganda. The Ugandan experience offered two important lessons that have continued to shape Tanzania’s approach to regional interventions. Firstly, a multilateral approach to resolving regional security issues is often cost-effective, and less likely to fuel suspicion or diplomatic alienation. Secondly, the role of external actors is not to impose order, but to create necessary conditions for the principled and legitimate domestic actors to ensure stability.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Tanzania tried to nurture promising Congolese movements but indiscipline and parochial politics prevented the rise of a popular, inclusive, and resilient political movement. A senior figure in Nyerere’s cycle informed me that “Mwalimu advised the Congolese elite to join forces in building a broad-based and resilient political party, but the advice fell on deaf ears.” Although Tanzania remains supportive of DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, its desire to help is constrained by a growing focus on economic diplomacy and the political conditions in DRC.
The failure and humiliation of SAMI-DRC will always be contrasted with the achievements of its predecessor, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB). Scholars have linked the humiliation of states (and armies) to a desire to salvage their standing. There is ongoing debate in South Africa about the need to revitalise the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Although there is no debate in Tanzania, the humiliation of SAMI-DRC has not gone unnoticed in Dar es Salaam.
Dastan Kweka is the founder of Fikra Institute and a PhD candidate in Political Science. He’s available at info@fikrainstitute.org or on X as @KwekaKweka. These are the writer’s own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of The Chanzo. Do you want to publish in this space? Contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com for further inquiries.
