About two years ago, the former Vice President and Prime Minister of Tanzania, Cleopa David Msuya, accepted my request for an interview, and invited me to his home in Dar es Salaam for a conversation. I had requested to interview him for my PhD thesis, and his acceptance came as a surprise because of how hard I had tried but failed to secure an interview with another former Prime Minister. All I had to do was email my questions to his assistants, and wait for him to return from a trip to his rural home in Kilimanjaro. He had, apparently, set up a system that was clear, predictable, and functional, even in retirement.
I found the late – he passed away on May 7, 2025 – Prime Minister Msuya’s memory sharp and arguments pointed, even at 92. My first question to him centred on the link between failures in the implementation of Ujamaa and Self-Reliance policy and the economic crisis that came to beset Tanzania in the 1970s. In his response, he sought to justify the policy, but also accepted gross failures in its implementation. He told me, “Western powers could push us around because of their industrial economies. We were producing what we did not consume, and consuming what we did not produce. Our intention was to change this situation.”
Scholars have determined that the diagnosis of the nature of the Tanzanian economy at the time, and the ambition to build an internally integrated economy, was correct. However, views on the essence and feasibility of Ujamaa remain fundamentally divided. The most sceptical scholars view Ujamaa as a utopian project that was bound to fail, while those sympathetic have attributed its failure to a hostile context characterised by the ascent of neoliberalism. For a detailed account of PM Msuya’s perspective on Ujamaa, I recommend his section in the book 38 Reflections on Nyerere by Mwapachu and Mwandosya (2022).
READ MORE: Tanzania’s Former Prime Minister and First Vice President, David Cleopa Msuya, Has Passed Away
In our conversation, PM Msuya told me, “At one point I was driving from a trip, and I went through the coast region [Pwani]. Houses were being destroyed, and people [were] forced to abandon their farms and relocate. I said, this cannot be Ujamaa. It is either they are settling old scores or a result of a general misunderstanding. That was not the spirit of Ujamaa. We tried to correct the mistakes.” I observed that criticism of Ujamaa aroused the late Prime Minister, perhaps because he knew it would partly define his legacy. According to him, what he witnessed in Pwani was largely due to policy interpretation failures.
The use of excessive force, as recounted by Msuya, is consistent with a strand of literature that points to the use of coercive measures in the implementation of Ujamaa, particularly in Southern Tanzania. By the early 1970s, implementation of Ujamaa was considered significantly ahead in Southern Tanzania, even as TANU worried about sluggish progress elsewhere. The progress in Southern Tanzania has partly been attributed to Wilbert Klerruu, who would later clash with, and lose his life in confrontation with a rich farmer in Iringa. It appears he had perfected his modus operandi during his time in Southern Tanzania.
It is unfortunate that I successfully defended my PhD thesis on the day Msuya passed away, May 7. My research examines the relationship between concerns over status, at the state level, and how this parameter shapes states’ decisions to wage wars. I specifically re-examine the motives behind Tanzania’s decision to resort to a full-scale war against Uganda, and found that – contrary to conventional understanding – the desire to protect Tanzania’s reputation as a resolute state was a key motive.
READ MORE: Socialism or Not, Tanzania’s Problem Is Essentially Not One of Ideology
I asked the late Msuya why Tanzania decided to resort to a full-scale war against Uganda, even after recovering its territory and at a time when the country was facing a dire economic situation. His response was short and clear: “What if he [Idi Amin] returned and attacked us again?” He added that the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) received instructions not to destroy Ugandan government buildings, but were allowed to take war spoils such as tanks and other equipment. Although I did not follow up on this comment, the conduct of the TPDF during its days in Uganda remains a sensitive subject. No wonder all official Kagera war materials remain classified.
Msuya was open enough to share his thoughts on several contemporary development issues. For instance, he wondered why the ongoing rural electrification efforts are guided more by the desire to ensure each village is connected to the grid, and not a targeted electrification approach that centred on enabling villages to engage in mechanised production and processing. He viewed a village as an “institution, and not a collection of houses” that had to be connected to the grid, and supplied with clean water and passable roads.
It was an honour to interact with and learn from Honourable Cleopa David Msuya. He was laid to rest in his rural home in Kilimanjaro on May 13, 2025. May his soul rest in eternal peace!
Dastan Kweka is the founder of Fikra Institute and a PhD candidate in Political Science. He’s available at info@fikrainstitute.org or on X as @KwekaKweka. These are the writer’s own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of The Chanzo. Do you want to publish in this space? Contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com for further inquiries.
