Globally and regionally, democracy is under increasing strain, with trends showing a steady rise in authoritarian practices, shrinking civic space, and manipulation of electoral processes.
Across Africa, many ruling parties have entrenched themselves through restrictive laws, judicial capture, digital repression, and the instrumentalisation of state institutions to suppress dissent. Freedom House has consistently reported declining trust in democratic institutions, weakened opposition parties, and a growing gap between formal democratic commitments and people’s lived realities.
Regionally, in East and Southern Africa, elections are increasingly characterised by overwhelming victories for incumbents, often raising questions about fairness and the authenticity of multiparty competition.
Elections are moving away from serving as mechanisms for accountability and peaceful alternation of power instead turning into rituals of legitimisation for ruling elites and the domination of a single party system. The menu of tools in the ritual involves the abuse of regular elections, parliaments, the judiciary and rule by law diminishing thereby substantive meaning of democracy.
In Tanzania the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi’s (CCM) hardly plausible victories of 84 per cent in 2020 in the last general elections and nearly 99 per cent in the 2024 civic elections fit the broader pattern of electoral dominance that undermines genuine multiparty democracy. More disturbingly, such ‘victories’ have been achieved on the back of large-scale disqualification of opposition candidates, intimidation, and systematic exclusion.
Competitive authoritarian regime
Tanzania is slipping into a competitive authoritarian regime, where elections are held but do not truly represent the will of the people. Report of the use of lawfare, arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, internet shutdowns, and intimidation of critics within both the opposition and ruling parties have already dampened the public perception and expectations of the elections.
In March 2024, three new electoral laws were signed, the Independent National Electoral Commission Act, the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors Elections Act and the Political Parties Affairs (Amendment) Act. Whilst framed as reforms, legal analysis shows they leave out some of the perennial concerns especially over appointments, removals, and funding of the INEC thus compromising its autonomy.
READ MORE: Passed Electoral Bills Give No Hope for Wider Women’s Participation in Leadership in Tanzania
It did not help that the 2024 civic polls were administered by the Ministry responsible for Local Government (RALG) rather than by INEC despite the explicit provision under section 10 (1) (c) of the law and in turn reproducing the very same irregularities reported in the 2019 local edition.
Despite the decision of the High Court in the case to restrict the election of candidates unopposed there still appears to be a great appetite for the exclusionary practice including with the ruling party. Immediately prior to the civic elections in November 2024, opposition parties complained that the majority of their candidates were disqualified, with one critic claiming that “over 90 per cent” of the disqualifications lacked substance.
CHADEMA, the largest opposition party on the mainland, noted that at least 100,000 candidates had been disqualified “for the same flimsy reasons as last time.” In the end, well over five thousand opposition candidates who were initially disqualified were reinstated on appeal. Eventually 80,430 CCM and 30,977 opposition candidates vied for the available seats, meaning that CCM aspirants ran unopposed for over 60 per cent of local ‘chairmanship’ posts.
CCM not spared
Even the ruling CCM has not been spared from the lure of running unopposed. The party’s extraordinary general meeting in January which was scheduled to elect a new Deputy National Chairperson, ended up appointing presidential candidates for the Union and Zanzibar along with the former’s running matter.
This violation of the party’s constitution has been called out by the party’s former Publicity Secretary, Humphrey Polepole, whilst the party’s members – Rev. Godfrey Malisa, and Mr Davidlevi Nestory – openly questioned the legitimacy of the nomination process. The former pursued judicial remedies a petition; Godfrey Fataeli Mlamie Malisa vs The Registered Trustees of Chama Cha Mapinduzi & Another,. The petition was nonetheless struck out on grounds of failure to exhaust internal remedies.
Meanwhile Malisa faced the wrath of the party with an abrupt expulsion from membership. In the meantime, Mr Nestory sought the intervention of the Office of the Registrar of Political parties inviting them to revoke the nomination of the CCM candidates for violation of procedure as provided under Articles 6, 7, 103, 105 and 108 of the CCM constitution.
He argued in his letter that the candidates had never submitted their nomination, the party nominating committees had never reviewed any applications and that no other member had been given their constitutionally guaranteed right to contest. In his response dated August 26, 2025, the Deputy Registrar of Political Parties, Mr Sisty Nyahoza evaded adjudication of the matter by simply claiming that the matter was before the court even though the court had already determined the matter on.
Assault on CHADEMA
On April 12, 2025, the Director of Elections, Mr Ramadhan Kailima, announced that “any party that did not sign the (electoral) code of conduct will not participate in the general election.” This appeared to have been in response to earlier complaints by CHADEMA who had expressed reservations against both the code and the principal legislation governing elections citing the electoral commission’s refusal to take into account their observations.
Three days prior to the signing, the party’s National Chairperson had been violently arrested in Mbinga district before being arraigned at the Kisutu resident magistrate court in Dar es Salaam on charges of treason and publication of false information. The arrest followed a national campaign launched by his party dubbed No Reform, No Elections calling for substantive reforms ahead of elections.
The move was called out by international Bar Associations and Human Rights Organisations as “a grave concern and worrying affront to the country’s constitutional order ahead of the 2025 General Elections.” Without citing any section of the law, Mr Kailima went further to announce that the party would be “banned from taking part in any by-elections until 2030.”
Luhaga Mpina’s troubles
That such a profound decision was made without granting any right to be heard to CHADEMA points to brazen impunity by the Director of Elections. The same impunity was in fact replicated in the case of the ACT Wazalendo presidential candidate Luhaga Joelson Mpina who was denied access to the INEC’s office in Dodoma to return his nomination forms having spent weeks crisscrossing the country to obtain the endorsement of 200 voters from 10 regions of Tanzania as required by section 33 of the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors Election Act.
It was unclear what motivated such brash behaviour from the Director of Election who according to ACT Wazalendo was acting in response to an earlier letter from the Registrar of Political Parties who had alleged that Mpina’s nomination had violated the procedure laid down in the party’s constitution.
Given the independence of the INEC provided under Section 6 of the INEC Act, it defeats logic why the INEC would be acting on the “instructions of the registrar,” especially since no evidence has been provided of a formal complaint against Mpina’s nomination as required under sections 36 and 27 of the same law.
The Tanganyika Law Society has called out the conduct of electoral authorities which goes against universally accepted principles of natural justice. At a press conference in Dar es Salaam, the TLS President Boniface Mwabukusi noted the aggressive enforcement of legislation in contravention of principles of fair, free and credible elections.
Litigation
Owing to these concerns, the electoral code was challenged in court by Kumbusho Kagine and Bubelwa Kaiza, whose petition was dismissed on the technicality that they lacked locus standi, highly regarded as neighbours to the process but not directly affected.
The court was invited to consider the propriety of certain requirements of the Code, such as prohibiting party agents from possessing mobile phones at polling stations, mandating voters to maintain distance from voting stations, excluding the tallying of results at polling stations, and disallowing complaints related to breaches of the Code from all stakeholders with a legitimate interest in elections except for candidates, amongst other deficiencies. The court instead chose to strike the matter off on the basis of technicalities.
In Moses Fanuel Omary and Others v Tume Huru ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi and Another, Constitutional Case No. 9684 of 2025, petitioners challenged sections of the Independent National Electoral Commission Act No. 2 of 2024, arguing they undermined the electoral commission’s independence, impartiality, and integrity by granting excessive executive power in appointments and discipline, limiting public participation, and lacking safeguards for equality, autonomy, and non-discrimination. Respondents asserted the provisions complied with the Constitution, particularly Article 74.
The court dismissed the petition, ruling the challenged provisions were constitutional and claims were unsubstantiated or policy-based, not legal. It found the Act’s appointment powers, administrative structures, and financial arrangements sound and not infringing on independence.
At the African Court, Tanzania will have to appear in the Ado Shaibu and others v The United Republic of Tanzania Application no 046 of 2020 to respond to reports of incidents of torture, discrimination, violence, unlawful and arbitrary intimidation, threats, arrest, and detention during the October 2020 general elections. These irregularities, the applicants argued, impaired their ability to participate in the elections, violating their rights under the African Charter, ICCPR, and the Maputo Protocol.
In Zanzibar, elections have historically been characterised by violence with disputed outcomes since the first multiparty elections which saw the ruling party announced winners with a contested margin. The 2000 elections led to bloodshed with at least 31 people killed whilst thousands fled out of the isles.
In 2015 polls, the Chairperson of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) unilaterally annulled the elections citing unevidenced electoral fraud. Things did not significantly improve in 2020 when CCM miraculously registered 76.6 per cent of the presidential votes whilst scooping all but four seats in the House of Representatives.
In the meantime, 18 people were reportedly killed with hundreds violently abducted, arrested or disappeared according to Journalists for Justice, an international network of journalists monitoring human rights globally. Attempts to address these concerns have so far met a deaf ear despite months of dialogue between the ruling CCM and the leading opposition party ACT Wazalendo.
Global concern
The international community has raised concern on the current events that are ongoing in Tanzania. The AU has issued a resolution concerning the human rights situation in Tanzania. The UN has urged Tanzania to conduct investigations on human rights violations, enforced disappearances of over 200 people and create a conducive environment for a free and fair election and implement the legal reforms recommended by AU on legitimacy of an independent candidate.
The AU resolution was made following complaints received from national and international human rights organisations to the continental body.
Tanzania’s poor record in complying with regional human rights and elections standards as noted in multiple cases before the African Court as well as observations by African Union Election Observation Missions imply the 2025 election will be carried out with limited credibility.
What looks like a walk in the park for the dominant party CCM may in fact be a slip into the ditch of uncharted waters of civil disobedience and illegitimacy. The Africa Governance Report 2023 by the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) noted how the absence of the rule of law and popular participation in electoral processes; irregular conduct of electoral processes; and absence of human rights and fundamental freedoms are a threat to stability and a trigger for unconstitutional changes of Government on the continent. Indeed, it was election controversy that triggered the ouster of Alpha Conde in Guinea in 2021.
To restore credibility and democratic stability in the Great Lakes region, Tanzania’s upcoming elections are crucial. Its current political impasse necessitates inclusive dialogue between leadership, opposition, and civil society. Failure to act risks further polarisation and the nation’s stability, potentially impacting upcoming elections in Uganda (2026) and Kenya (2027).
Deus Valentine Rweyemamu is the Chief Executive Officer of the Center for Strategic Litigation. He’s available at deus@strategiclawcentre.org and on X as @DeusValentine. The opinions expressed here are the writer’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of The Chanzo. If you are interested in publishing in this space, please contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com.
One Response
Credibility is Built, Not Declared
By a friend of facts, not factions
Healthy scepticism is the salt of democracy — lakini too much salt kills the stew. The Chanzo’s essay, “Can Tanzania Deliver a Credible Election?” offers necessary provocations, but also risks freezing a moving picture. Tanzania’s 2025 election is not a ritual already scripted; it is a contest playing out inside new laws, new logistics, and yes, new tensions. If we are to be marafiki wa ukweli — friends of fact — let’s weigh claims against the record: the reforms enacted, the hard problems exposed, and the yardsticks by which credibility in October will be measured.
1) From 2020’s bruises to a reopened, if uneven, field
No serious observer romanticises 2020. Independent assessments called out intimidation, arbitrary arrests and a shrunken civic space; even where some missions praised polling‑day order, others judged the overall environment “not free, not fair.” Those scars are on the public record.
Yet it is also true that since January 2023, the political field reopened in concrete ways: the six‑year ban on opposition rallies was lifted; several media outlets returned; and a formal dialogue on reforms was launched. These steps did not erase the past — lakini they materially changed the terrain on which 2025 is being contested.
The honest verdict: 2025 sits in the tension between memory and movement. To flatten the moment into a static label like “competitive authoritarianism” ignores both the setbacks and the steps forward.
2) The 2024 legal reset: new scaffolding, unfinished ceilings
In March 2024, Tanzania assented to three core statutes: the Independent National Electoral Commission Act, 2024; the Presidential, Parliamentary and Councillors Elections Act, 2024; and the Political Parties Affairs (Amendment) Act, 2024. Beyond rebranding “NEC” to INEC, the laws:
a. Create a stand‑alone INEC framework with nomination/tenure provisions;
b. Remove District Executive Directors as returning officers to reduce conflicts of interest;
c. Provide a pathway for INEC to manage civic polls;
d. Introduce protections against election‑related sexual violence and broaden inclusion measures.
Civil society legal reviews salute these gains while urging deeper independence on funding and appointments, and judicial review of presidential results — a fair ask that keeps pressure on the system to improve.
3) About the 2024 civic polls: yes, lopsided — and a lesson that stuck
The op‑ed is right that 2024 local government elections were administered by PO‑RALG (not INEC) and produced a lopsided CCM sweep (~98–99%). Opposition parties cried foul over disqualifications; rights groups and clergy condemned violence and abductions. These concerns are real, documented, and serious. Also not to be ignored is the data set showing opposition parties failing to put up candidates many constituencies.
But it’s also true this was flagged in advance as a transitional gap. A national stakeholders’ conference urged moving civic polls to INEC and aligning constitutional provisions to fully operationalize the 2024 statutes across all tiers. That is a forward‑looking fix, not a post‑hoc excuse. Crucially, the 2025 general election is administered by INEC under the new law.
4) The plumbing matters: rolls, kits, and explainable numbers
For 2025, INEC has published the election calendar and footprint: 272 constituencies, 3,960 wards, and nearly 100,000 polling stations. The Permanent Voter Register (PVR) was updated in two phases, reaching 37,655,559 registrants — a 26.5% rise over 2020.
Critics questioned demographic plausibility; INEC’s Director publicly explained that roughly 3.1 million of the “new” entries are citizens who were eligible in 2015/2020 but never registered, with about 4 million truly new 18+ voters — a reconciliation based on law and outreach rather than magic. This explanation is on the record and available for scrutiny.
Under the bonnet, INEC upgraded to lighter Android‑based BVR kits with offline capture and later sync, fingerprint de‑duplication, and an online self‑update window. You may not see these gadgets on a podium, lakini this is exactly how a register becomes more accurate, accessible, and auditable.
5) Lawfare or law working? The CHADEMA code dispute and the Mpina zig‑zag
The flashpoint is CHADEMA’s refusal to sign the Electoral Code of Conduct and INEC’s decision to exclude the party — with statements suggesting disqualification extends through 2030. Multiple outlets reported the Commission’s position; CHADEMA’s attorneys argue the law prescribes penalties, not an outright long‑term ban. This is a justiciable disagreement — and courts are the proper venue.
On the other side, when INEC initially rejected ACT‑Wazalendo’s Luhaga Mpina on nomination grounds, the High Court ordered INEC to receive and process his forms — a ruling that INEC then wrestled with amid further objections, prompting renewed litigation. You may dislike the ping‑pong, but it shows institutions engaging and being challenged in real time.
Kwa kifupi: let’s fight over law in the law. That’s how institutional trust grows — not through fatalism.
6) Rights climate: neither denial nor despair — the watchful middle
Human rights reporting in 2024–25 documents alarming patterns: abductions, enforced disappearances, treason charges, and media/digital restrictions (including targeted platform disruptions and the Jamii Forums suspension). These are not rumours; they are findings that demand transparent investigation and accountability.
At the same time, respected domestic organisations (LHRC, TCF, Twaweza) have adopted a plural posture: affirming concrete legal improvements, pressing for more insulation of INEC, and tracking public sentiment. Twaweza’s Sauti za Wananchi data show 69% of Tanzanians recently saying the country is headed in the right direction — a reminder that legitimacy is also a lived perception, not only a legal checklist.
7) Zanzibar’s long shadow — and the 2025 proof points
Zanzibar’s history — annulments, casualties, zero‑sum victories — hangs heavy. That memory should sharpen our eyes, not close them. The test in 2025 is whether today’s systems (from rolls to tallysheets to dispute resolution) block yesterday’s pathologies. That answer will be measured at the level of polling‑station forms, observer access, and court timelines — not by punditry alone.
8) What “credible” will look like in October — measured, not proclaimed
Ukweli usiofungwa kamba — the truth cannot be tethered. Here are practical, verifiable yardsticks that all of us — parties, media, citizens, observers — can monitor:
Auditable voter register: Public inspection, clear add/remove criteria, duplicate detection, and documented reconciliation for the 37.65m figure. INEC should invite third‑party statistical spot checks.
Even‑handed nominations & Code enforcement: Where contested, reasoned, time‑bound judicial review (as with Mpina) — not flank maneuvers via bureaucracy.
Polling‑day transparency: Consistent opening/closing procedures; posted Results Forms at ~100,000 stations; and open tallying that allows form‑to‑form verification.
Observer access: Domestic and regional missions admitted under standard terms; findings published quickly and disaggregated between mainland and Zanzibar.
Security & digital restraint: No blanket platform shutdowns; any restrictions must be lawful, narrow, time‑bound, and reviewable; credible probes where violence or abductions are alleged.
9) A fairer conclusion
Calling 2025 a mere “ritual of legitimisation” before ballots are cast short‑changes the work already done — and the oversight still being done in open court, in the registry, and at training tables in district halls. There are unresolved risks — the CHADEMA impasse first among them — and rights concerns that require daylight and remedy. Lakini there is also a reconstituted electoral body in law; modernised voter registration with technical safeguards; a reopened rally space (unevenly policed, yes, but real); and judges issuing orders that bite.
As we like to say: mtu hujengwa na tabia, na Taifa hujengwa na taratibu — a person is built by character, and a nation by procedures. In October, judge Tanzania not by fatalism but by evidence: the quality of the roll, the fairness of access, the clarity of tallysheets, the calm of our streets, and the speed and integrity of our courts. That is how credibility is built — not declared.
Notes & Sources (selected)
Legal & institutional: INEC Act (official English version, July 10, 2024); LHRC Post‑Enactment Analysis (2024); Strategic Litigation legal review (June 2024); The Citizen synthesis (June 11, 2024).
Administration & figures: INEC portal (constituencies, stations); IPP Media/The Guardian (37.6m registrants, Jul 26, 2025); The Chanzo on register reconciliation (Aug 4, 2025); The Citizen on tech upgrades (May 15, 2024); The Chanzo on new BVR (Mar 6, 2025).
Local polls 2024: The Citizen (Nov 29, 2024); Daily News (Nov 29, 2024); DW analysis (Dec 2, 2024).
Code dispute & litigation: BBC report via The Star (Apr 14, 2025); Africanews (Apr 13, 2025); The Citizen and Daily News on Mpina rulings (Sept 2025); Reuters via MSN (Sept 15, 2025); The Chanzo Morning Briefing (Sept 25, 2025).
Rights & digital space: U.S. State Dept HR Report 2024 (released July 2025); analysis of social media clampdown and Jamii Forums suspension (Sept 2025).
Public sentiment: Twaweza Sauti za Wananchi coverage — The Citizen (Aug 16, 2024); The Chanzo (Aug 13, 2024).
Historical baselines: Tanzania Elections Watch Final Report (Feb 2021); AU Expert Mission (Nov 2020); EISA & EAC preliminary statements (Oct 2020).