The Rwandan-backed M23 has captured Goma again, marking its return since its defeat in 2013. Back then, M23, which had dominated Goma for a year, was crushed within three months by the UN Intervention Brigade under the command of former Tanzanian Chief of Staff of the Tanzania People’s Defence Force (TPDF), Lieutenant General James Aloizi Mwakibolwa.
The capture of Goma comes as no surprise. Since the beginning of 2024, M23, with direct support from Rwanda, has made rapid and extensive territorial gains, seizing a vast area of North Kivu, much larger than any territory it had previously controlled. Notably, M23 has been aggressively recruiting fighters through propaganda, political maneuvering, and forced conscription, including the recruitment of child soldiers, to bolster its forces.
Moreover, M23 has been forging alliances with other armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Its political arm, the Congo River Alliance (AFC), has been actively working to enhance its image. Additionally, M23 has gained significant financial resources after capturing the coltan-rich region of Rubaya. The production of coltan from Rubaya provides M23 with at least USD 800,000 per month, and the capture of Goma now grants it even greater financial gains through taxation.
These advances, backed by Rwanda, have deepened mistrust within the East African Community (EAC), the unity which was already strained by this challenge and now SADC is also experiencing new frustrations on the issue.
SAMIDRC: Failed mission?
In its extraordinary summit to discuss the DRC crisis, SADC acknowledged attacks on its forces by the M23 armed group and the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF). The summit admitted that the mission’s objectives of SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) had not yet been realized, signaling its continuation and calling for a joint summit between SADC, the East African Community (EAC).
The key question remains: After a year of operations in the DRC, why has the SAMIDRC mission failed to achieve what the UN Intervention Brigade accomplished in 2013?
From the outset, SAMIDRC was designed to collaborate with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). This strategic choice was likely made to reassure DRC authorities of SAMIDRC’s commitment, particularly after President Félix Tshisekedi became disillusioned with EAC forces and demanded their withdrawal.
However, FARDC itself faces deep structural issues, particularly divided loyalties among its military personnel. Formed through a series of failed integration efforts involving different armed groups, FARDC has suffered repeated betrayals, with its own soldiers defecting to armed factions or forming new groups completely. A lack of trust in FARDC has led to strict rationing of military supplies, particularly armor and heavy weapons, to prevent defections or the resale of equipment to armed groups. This distrust might also explain why the DRC lacks large military bases in eastern regions, despite ongoing conflict.
The first challenge for SAMIDRC was to build trust and ensure protection of its plans and operations as it coordinate with FARDC, the nature of the DRC army itself makes this challenging. It should be noted by the end of the year 2024, DRC President made several changes of most of its key officials in the army, the reasoning might be how some of these operations were progressing.
Another critical challenge is the direct involvement of Rwandan forces. Reports estimate that between 3,000 and 4,000 Rwandan troops have entered the DRC since December 2023, it’s expected that more troops have entered the country following this new development.
Rwanda’s involvement has transformed M23’s military capabilities, introducing modern warfare technologies. This includes the use of jamming and spoofing systems which essentially make it impossible to use aircraft, drones, or helicopters, also the introduction of Short range air defense (SHORAD) system, set to counter aerial attacks.
Other technology includes the use of surveillance drones and night-vision goggles, 122 mm rockets and anti-tank guided missile. As retired South African General Maomela Motau noted, M23 fighters no longer resemble traditional guerrilla forces. This is a far cry from the 2012–2013 M23, which was weakened by internal conflicts between Bosco Ntaganda and current commander Sultani Makenga.
FARDC’s unpopularity among civilians is another issue. Many of its soldiers are either poorly paid or not paid at all, leading them to illegally tax local populations. The Wazalendo militia, loosely allied with FARDC, has also engaged in brutality and extortion, further eroding public trust. While M23 exploits this discontent to justify its actions, its own claims of legitimacy are exaggerated. However, its lower taxation policies compared to FARDC and Wazalendo give it an advantage in some areas.
Additionally, SAMIDRC faces constraints due to international scrutiny. Unlike M23, which ignores global concerns, SAMIDRC forces operate under international law and must protect their home countries’ reputations. For example, SAMIDRC receive international pressure when it launched 122mm rockets in February 2024, which was also used by armies supporting M23 also later in the year.
The lack of international pressure on M23, unlike in 2013 is another major setback, largely due to geopolitical shifts. Ultimately, SAMIDRC was thrown into a lion’s den—they had to collaborate with a deeply flawed FARDC, fight against advanced forces, and operate under diplomatic scrutiny. Unlike in 2013, now it is not the fight against militias who receive support, but a well-equipped, state-backed military force.
The East African Community (EAC)
Members of the EAC are all experiencing complication emanating from DRC crisis. For example, Rwanda and Burundi remain at odds, each supporting and allying with groups in DRC which they consider adversaries. Burundi has accused Rwanda of collaborating with Red Tabara, a group it claims is responsible for attacks on its territory. Meanwhile, Rwanda views Burundi’s involvement in the DRC as an act of betrayal, and its cooperation with the CNRD-FLN, a group that Rwanda seeks to eliminate strain their relation even more.
While Uganda is cooperating with the DRC on Operation Shujaa, which aims to curtail its sworn enemy, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF),leader of M23’s political arm is reported to live in Uganda, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC). Reports indicate that M23 operatives move freely within Uganda, and their armed allies, Zaïre/ADCVI is reported to have established a support and transit point for their combatants on a farm in Hoima district, near Lake Albert.
Kenya has been in the DRC’s gray zone since it allowed a meeting that launched the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)–Congo River Alliance in Nairobi. This political arm of M23 was formally introduced in December 2023 by Corneille Nangaa, the former head of the DRC Electoral Commission. At the time, Nangaa, dressed in a clean dark suit, presented himself as a unifier of various political groups, claiming that the alliance had brought together 70 factions.
Since then, the AFC has functioned as the political wing of M23, with Nangaa reportedly receiving direct instructions from M23 commander Sultani Makenga. More recently, Nangaa has changed his public image, growing a gray beard and wearing military fatigues to portray himself as a guerrilla fighter. His rhetoric has become increasingly aggressive, openly discussing plans to capture Kinshasa.
Within SADC, tensions have escalated between South Africa, a key participant in the SADC mission in the DRC, and Rwanda. The rapid territorial advances of M23 have further dented the credibility of the SADC mission in the region.
Notably, Tanzania and the DRC are the only countries that hold membership in both SADC and EAC. Tanzania, an influential member of both blocs, has significant security and economic interests in the DRC. This strategic positioning places Tanzania in a challenging yet potentially crucial role as a mediator.
Why the development matters to Tanzania
While Rwanda has been at the forefront of criticizing South Africa, it has remained strategically silent on Tanzania who also contribute forces on SAMIDRC. I believe this silence is partly due to economic interests especially due to the SGR rail deal between Tanzania and Rwanda, port deals, as well as the bolstered relation between Rwanda and Tanzania during Magufuli era.
Nonetheless, developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are critical for Tanzania. I believe that reinforcement of Tanzania’s troops is likely, if this has not yet happened. From an economic and strategic standpoint, the DRC is one of Tanzania’s biggest port clients, making DRC stability one of the important factor for Tanzania. The rhetoric surrounding the M23 movement, the branding of Corneille Nangaa, fast paced recruitment and the speech made by Kagame questioning the legitimacy of Felix Tshisekedi citing he has never been elected suggests an eventual march toward Kinshasa. Any destabilization of the DRC would inevitably affect Tanzania, as it has in the past.
Tanzania has a significant role to play in this situation, especially in terms of mediation outside and inside the existing framework and through bilateral engagement. It can also work to create a neutral platform for the international community to engage especially on their geopolitical interests. However, Tanzania should also prepare firmly for a worst-case scenario.
It’s also important to consider the geopolitical landscape. There is an ongoing struggle between China and the West for access to critical minerals. Over 50 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves are in the DRC, a material crucial for electric vehicles, aviation, and the defense industry. Notably, over 70 percent of the global cobalt production comes from DRC. Additionally, 70 percent of the world’s coltan reserves are in the DRC, which is essential for electronics.
For example, according to a World Bank report, China controls 85 percent of the global cobalt supply, largely due to its presence in the DRC through its company, China Molybdenum. This geopolitical struggle itself raises concerns about the international community’s response and its genuine intentions regarding the conflict.
Does the international community view destabilization in mineral rich parts of the DRC, specifically the Eastern part as the only way to secure access to critical minerals? If this worst-case scenario unfolds, China will likely take steps to protect its interests, using financial enticements and diplomacy to ensure regional countries support its interest in DR Congo. The West will likely do the same, putting DRC back to the position it once was. The presence of mercenaries further complicates the situation, signaling if things escalate, they could spiral out of control very quickly.
This geopolitical complexity calls for a sincere African solution. The double-dealing and backstabbing must stop. Do countries in the region see open war as a more effective means to achieve their goals? For Rwanda, it seems that there is an expectation that DRC has to dance to its tune or face the music, its rhetoric point to a belief that, it is a master who is destined to make a client state out of DRC by every means possible.This approach mirrors a form of neo-colonialism and is unacceptable.
Additionally, the larger issue at hand is the weakness of the DRC as a state. The country has a weak military, weak leadership, and is plagued by self-serving groups like M23, FDLR, and over 100 other armed factions. This makes the prospects for the DRC even more dire. Furthermore, the ‘conflict economy’ has encouraged many young men to believe that conflict is the only means of survival, which only exacerbates the situation.
The leadership vacuum and lack of viable solutions, coupled with a tendency to ignore the problem, will only turn the region into a testing ground for various weapons and perhaps the next hub for military adventures. The proposed SADC and EAC summit must provide real solutions.
Tony Alfred K is a writer and analyst working with The Chanzo. He can be reached at tony@thechanzo.com and on X @tonyalfredk. These are the writer’s own opinions, and they do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of The Chanzo Initiative. Do you want to publish in this space? Contact our editor at editor@thechanzo.com.
