The Rwandan-backed M23 has continued its rapid advances taking over two major cities with millions of residents. First, it was Goma in January, and now Bukavu. This is aside from the vast territory the group has controlled since early 2024, including mineral-rich areas like Rubaya. Reports indicate that the group is now looking to take Uvira.
Most of M23’s advances are widely shared and strategically amplified by the group and its supporters on social media, making this one of the armed conflicts in East Africa with heavy strategic use of social media. A close analysis of the communication shared online reveals various objectives behind this approach.
Legitimacy
One of the most widely circulated images from the M23 takeover of Bukavu shows some of the group’s fighters posing for a video at Place de l’Indépendance, a symbolic site marking DR Congo’s independence from Belgium. This is just one of many images and videos from M23, that shows how the group prioritizes the strategic use of social media.
Examining the dissemination of the group’s messages online, several strategic goals become evident. One key objective is legitimacy. M23 has been attempting to reshape its image beyond the widespread perception that it is merely a Rwandan proxy serving Rwanda’s interests in Congo. This perception, dating back to 2012, has been difficult to dispel and remains strong among the majority of the Congolese, especially given Rwanda’s current involvement and direct support of M23’s recent movements.
Using social media, M23, and its supporters maintain a steady stream of positive moments showcasing their engagement with citizens, particularly images of members of the public giving them a warm welcome. The group is also actively promoting the persona of liberators, both online and offline. At the regional level, M23 has been leveraging social media to reshape its image, portraying itself as a political movement with significant support and acceptance among the population.
M23 has maintained a strong presence on social media, using French, English, Kinyarwanda, and Kiswahili. This is largely due to a network of strategically aligned social media accounts sympathetic to the ‘M23 cause’ from Rwanda’s perspective. These accounts actively share M23’s advances and counter-narratives that undermine Rwanda and M23. So far, they have been highly effective, particularly in communicating across all relevant regional languages.
This multilingual approach is a notable achievement, especially considering that Kinshasa has struggled to do the same, beyond the occasional statements from the foreign affairs minister, most of its official communication remains in French and there is little knowledge of what the Congolese army FARDC is doing.
Additionally, there is a broader network of regional politicians and intellectuals who, while not openly identifying as M23 supporters, frequently provide historical accounts or narratives that align with M23’s and Rwanda’s propagation. Many of them, either directly or indirectly, maintain close ties with Kigali.
DR Congo struggles
M23 is not only telling its own story on social media but is also shaping and amplifying the narrative it wants for the DR Congo regime. So far, it has effectively depicted a weak Congolese army, one that suffers from poor supply, indiscipline, inadequate training, and lacks morale or ability to fight. Above all, M23 has strategically portrayed itself as unstoppable but merciful, frequently sharing images of Congolese soldiers surrendering and being spared. This has become a dominant narrative online, it is also a recruitment strategy, as it seeks to expand and diversify its army.
READ: Rwanda and M23 Attacks in DRC Deepen Mistrust in EAC, Cause Confusion in SADC. Can Tanzania Do More?
Following the fall of Bukavu, the Congolese government appears to be responding, also sharing its messages on social media about its recruitment drive. The revival of the #BendeleEkweyaTe campaign and the emergence of #PoisonRwandais, which seems aimed at countering Rwanda’s narrative, indicate a shift in strategy. While there are pockets of diaspora who share some messages to counter the Rwanda/M23 narrative, the lack of strategy by DR Congo’s government is hurting its position.
The dominant images on social media remain those of Congolese soldiers in tattered uniforms, fleeing various areas such as Bukavu, being paraded by M23, or fleeing at any hint that M23 is on its way, it’s a perspective that can only break the morale of the nation if it continues.
Just today, February 19, 2025, as news broke that M23 was advancing toward Uvira, it was reported that chaos ensued as many FARDC soldiers scrambled to board a boat heading to Kalemie. The seed of fear has already spread. Unless DR Congo finds its strength and crafts a new narrative, no one knows how many more cities will succumb to this fear. This situation may also discourage regional allies from committing sincerely.
M23’s mastery of narrative control is worth analyzing. One striking example occurred just a day before the EAC and SADC summit when M23 staged a massive rally in Goma. While the group had previously held a similar rally after taking Goma in 2012, this time was different, particularly in its use of social media. Although there were claims that residents had no choice but to attend, with phrases such as “usiposikia kwa masikio utasikia kwa mwili” (“if you don’t listen with your ears, you will listen with your body”) allegedly being used, the rally nonetheless shifted perceptions on social media, especially at the regional level. M23 successfully created the impression that it has a genuine constituency.
There is also a growing sense of confidence within M23, the group is not only displaying its strength but also spreading a message of defiance in the hope of inspiring civilian uprisings, this is in a bid to ease difficult work to reach its goal of taking Kinshasa.
Military Goals
One of the videos recently circulated by the group features Sultani Makenga, the M23 commander, speaking to former FARDC soldiers at an M23 reform/training camp. Notably, his address to the recruits reveals key insights worth reflecting.
“Tshisekedi’s leadership must be removed so that citizens can live in peace, and we can have a dignified country where citizens are respected and we can have a strong army, an army of the people,” Makenga tells the recruits, who respond to some of his rhetorical questions throughout his speech.
“We are going to have an army that is not based on tribalism. We are going to eliminate all the ignorance that Tshisekedi has instilled—tribalism, drug abuse, stealing from citizens, oppressing citizens, killing citizens, and even killing some just because of their ethnicity,” he continues. At one point, he asks the recruits if they are well-fed, to which they respond affirmatively.
He further said: “You have been captured by your Congolese brothers, so don’t worry. You are here to be reformed. You must have discipline, there is no army without discipline. The ARC army is the army that will liberate this country and free the Congolese people. After a little training and transformation, you will be integrated so that we can liberate our country and free the Congolese people.”
The video, widely shared by pro-M23 accounts, presents the group as an alternative to the perceived shortcomings of the FARDC army. The recruits are later seen receiving new uniforms, and it’s reported they have received their payment, with a video of them in their new gear subsequently shared on social media. In contrast, footage of FARDC soldiers fleeing from Bukavu in disorganized, non-standard military attire paints a starkly different picture. These contrasting visuals, one showing M23’s structured recruitment and another showing FARDC troops retreating, are seen not only by external observers but also by the Congolese people themselves.
Such images serve M23 in two ways: they aid in recruitment by projecting an image of strength and organization, while also demoralizing fighters within the Congolese army. On social media, FARDC is often depicted through narratives of “notable absence,” surrendering to M23 or retreating from battle. As a result, the most significant and compelling stories about the Congolese army are being told by M23 itself.
Regional Goals
One of the most striking images from the conflict so far is that of a South African soldier waving a white flag during M23 advances. This, along with the killing of 14 South African soldiers, has deeply affected South Africa, with many in the country’s corridors of power admitting it to be the worst humiliation their military has faced.
For M23 and its supporters, this image was a propaganda gift. M23 leveraged it on social media, portraying themselves as both dominant and generous, supporters even boasted about how M23 was generous enough to feed the SAMIDRC forces.
On Monday, a pro-M23 reporter visited the bases where SAMIDRC forces are stationed, now reportedly surrounded by M23. The emphasis in the coverage was on the claim that the armies from SADC nations had surrendered. A video clip showed a vehicle with a white flag, with the reporter repeatedly highlighting the surrender aspect. This is all part of a psychological strategy aimed at pressuring SADC mission troops and preventing a repeat of 2012 when SADC forces under the UN banner launched a decisive attack that led to M23’s defeat.
By amplifying “the humiliation” of the South African army on social media, M23 strategically sought to create internal pressure on the South African government to withdraw. This strategy has been somewhat effective—although Pretoria has stated it will not withdraw abruptly, it has acknowledged M23’s role in the conflict and pushed for direct dialogue between the Congolese state and M23. This outcome is notably different from 2012 when Uganda-led negotiations failed to yield such direct recognition.
While M23 continues to skillfully use social media as a propaganda tool, DR Congo’s repeated military setbacks and lack of an effective counter-narrative put it in a poor light, potentially diminishing its influence even further.
As regional actors push for dialogue as the best path to reducing human suffering, the use of social media in this conflict leaves, many military and conflict experts in East Africa with a case study to ponder. Most governments are more accustomed to traditional media, such as newspapers and television, rather than social media.
As it is evident in DRC, this new front requires well-planned strategies and preparation to effectively counter-propaganda, and also leverage its advantages to your benefit.
Tony Alfred K is a writer and analyst working with The Chanzo. He can be reached at tony@thechanzo.com and on X @tonyalfredk. These are the writer’s own opinions, and they do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of The Chanzo Initiative. Do you want to publish in this space? Contact our editor at editor@thechanzo.com.
