Several days ago, the government spokesman, Gerson Msigwa, held a press conference to clarify the government’s position during what has become the most turbulent period of the year in Tanzania. The briefing followed a dramatic series of events surrounding the general election that concluded with Samia Suluhu Hassan being declared the winner.
The aftermath saw the deaths of several young protesters and the detention of many others. While the exact number of casualties remains uncertain, what stands out even more is the conflicting accounts of what actually happened on October 29, 2025.
Various state officials and, most recently, the President and the Prime Minister have described what looked like the Gen-Z–led protests as the work of “paid demonstrators,” “youth who don’t know what they are doing,” or acts of “economic sabotage.”
Amid local media struggling to access complete and validated information, especially regarding the internet shutdown, international outlets have been relying on fragments shared by Tanzanians online, geo-tagged videos and pictures posted on X formerly Twitter by zealous Tanzanians who have sessions on Tanganyikan, a room in Clubhouse. This context set the stage for the government to present its own version of events.
The press by the government official followed a series of narratives proposed to explain what happened, and among these, the allegation of “economic sabotage” was the most remarkable. This prominence does not arise because sabotage is unknown or recent globally, but because of the many questions it prompts.
I’m filled to a convincing level of certainty that this economic sabotage raises questions that every concerned citizen couldn’t help but ask: If the demonstrations truly were acts of economic sabotage, then who would want to harm us? Should Tanzania genuinely be worried about external economic assaults? Would the perpetrators be powerful global nations, international organisations, or neighbouring states? Who gains from political unrest in a country like Tanzania? And is the government targeting the correct actors through the arrests so far made?
Not a new concept
Economic sabotage is not a new concept. It is a tactic often used by competing nations seeking strategic dominance or access to valuable resources. Recent examples include the tense U.S.–China trade conflicts, where both countries imposed tariffs and sanctions that disrupted each other’s industries.
Likewise, the EU and the United States have sanctioned Russia over the invasion of Ukraine, prompting countermeasures with global economic ripple effects. The long-standing hostility between Israel and Iran has also taken economic shape, especially after the recent military clashes.
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So if Tanzania is experiencing sabotage, what kind is it? Is it comparable to the U.S.–China model? The EU–Russia model? Or is it something far smaller and more localised?
Attempting to answer these questions requires a brief step back to understand Tanzania’s economic position. According to the International Monetary Fund, Tanzania is a lower-middle-income country with a GDP of roughly USD 87 billion and a per capita income of around USD 1,200.
The World Bank notes that the economy is diverse, driven by agriculture, industry, tourism, and services, with agriculture employing about two-thirds of the population. Tanzania’s exports—gold, tourism, and agricultural products remain in high global demand.
The country recorded real GDP growth of 5.3 per cent in 2023, rising to 5.7 per cent in 2024, and was projected to grow by 6 per cent in 2025, supported by public investments and business-environment reforms. Still, Tanzania is not among Africa’s top three or five economic powers. It ranks between 8th and 11th by GDP size (depending on source) and 31st in per capita GDP (PPP).
If someone were targeting Tanzania’s economy, one must ask: why? What makes the country supposedly vulnerable to such sabotage? Tanzania is a central transit country for East and Southern Africa, bordering Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, and the Indian Ocean.
Most of these neighbours, except Kenya, depend on Tanzanian ports for their imports and exports. This clearly indicates that a stable Tanzania is in the region’s best interest. While the World Bank ranks Tanzania 88th on the Logistics Performance Index, behind Kenya and Rwanda, its ports in Dar es Salaam, Tanga, and Mtwara remain critical conduits for regional cargo, especially for the DRC and Zambia.
Would Congo or Zambia want Tanzania destabilised? Highly unlikely. Zambia maintains deep bilateral ties with Tanzania, particularly through the rehabilitation of the TAZARA railway. The DRC relies heavily on Tanzania for logistical support of its cargo and even regional mediation during the M23 recurring crisis.
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Such countries stand to lose, not gain, from Tanzanian instability. What about Burundi? Sandwiched between countries with which it has periodic tensions, the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Burundi benefits from stability in Tanzania, its most consistent ally, and even more so, the country that has seen its rich tycoons run to invest in.
Uganda also seems an unlikely saboteur. The two countries share major projects, such as the EACOP oil pipeline, and their political and historical ties run deep. Allegations circulating on social media about Ugandan involvement in the recent events have not been officially substantiated, and given the close relationship between the countries, Uganda would have little incentive to undermine Tanzania’s economy relative to other EAC countries.
A more complex picture
Rwanda presents a more complex picture due to fluctuating diplomatic tensions despite the current trade commitments. Tanzania recently blocked Rwanda’s milk products, prompting Rwanda to reroute some cargo through Kenya and expand its cargo operations.
Accusations regarding the presence of non-Tanzanians in government positions have fuelled suspicion in sections of the public, and Rwanda has been pointed fingers at, but still, Rwanda also relies on Tanzania for mediation during regional disputes, and despite tensions, economic sabotage would be self-defeating.
Tanzania is also known to respond strongly when provoked, meaning any objective evidence of sabotage would have triggered a visible diplomatic reaction. This leaves Kenya a frequent competitor and sometimes rival.
Tanzania and Kenya have a history of trade disputes involving the confiscation of goods, temporary border closures, and regulatory disagreements. Both countries compete heavily in tourism.
In 2024, Tanzania received about 2.6 million international tourists (5.6 million total domestic and international), with Kenya accounting for a substantial share of arrivals, while Kenya hosted around 2.4 million tourists. Tanzania currently leads in intra-EAC trade, exporting more to Kenya and the region than it imports.
Notably, Kenya has borne the burden of the sabotage allegation, not only because of its close social and economic ties with Tanzania but also because Kenya has become a go-to option for many Tanzanian government critics, and whenever political dynamics spill over, they often do so across the border, affecting business at the border and not anywhere further than that.
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While any political unrest in Tanzania would have shifted some tourist flows to Kenya and vice versa, there are two reasons Kenya is unlikely to sabotage Tanzania. First, Kenya benefits significantly from a stable Tanzanian market for its goods.
Also, Tanzania typically retaliates decisively when it perceives economic hostility; the recent Kenya Airways ban is an example. No such retaliation has occurred during and after the protests, suggesting the government itself does not view Kenya as the culprit.
If neither major world powers nor regional neighbours fit the profile, could international organisations be behind the alleged sabotage?
Recent debates in Kenya have included accusations against the Ford Foundation, and Tanzanian officials have indirectly echoed similar concerns. Yet no evidence has been made public, and no arrests or official investigations targeting international organisations have been announced. Assuming such actors paid protesters to burn property or attack installations, without proof, remains premature.
This leads back to the core question: Is Tanzania diagnosing the right problem? To understand the unrest, four things must be scrutinised: the nature of the problem, the composition of those involved, the drivers behind it, and its impact.
Government’s failures
Multiple sources describe the demonstrations as part of a global Gen-Z movement, similar to those seen in Nepal, Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Mexico. These movements share a common root: governments failing to respond to the expectations of youth populations.
In Tanzania, the demonstrators raised concerns about fair elections, unemployment, and rising living costs. The videos and photos shared online clearly show that the protesters are mainly Gen Z, a generation that communicates, organises, and demands accountability differently.
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The 2022 census shows that 77 per cent of Tanzanians are under 35, forming a large, ambitious population whose expectations differ significantly from those of older generations.
Even so, the uprisings by Gen-Z, particularly in the Global South, have been explained as reflecting how the generations are taking action to pressure governments to address social and economic challenges.
Further research works on Gen Z by the likes of McKinsey indicate that this generation values openness, truth, dialogue, and realism. Even advanced economies struggle to manage Gen-Z-driven mobilisation when outdated governance methods are applied.
Same pattern
Protests in Kenya, Madagascar, and Nepal have revealed the same pattern: this is a generation that cannot be managed with old tactics. Tanzania should have anticipated this shift and prepared for a new mode of political engagement—one grounded in the reality that, for the next half-century, governance will be shaped by a predominantly youthful society.
The troubling observation is that the current administration neither understands nor meaningfully attempts to understand the aspirations, frustrations, and political language of this generation.
Its limited efforts translate into ineffective strategies, which are replaced by defensive, coercive, and reactionary responses. What is even more concerning is that the generations that follow are likely to be more assertive, more informed, and more demanding of accountability.
These issues raise a deeper set of unresolved questions. Can “economic sabotage” credibly explain what happened on October 29, 2025, and the events that followed, or is its repetition a strategic move to divert public attention from more essential concerns?
READ MORE: Tanzania After October 29, 2025: Reclaiming the Island of Peace
The truth may lie somewhere in between, but it is clear that more transparent, evidence-based answers are needed before any narrative can be accepted or dismissed.
What remains certain is that the public is far more informed and attentive than in previous times, and the government must exercise caution when establishing an agenda, whether through official statements, media framing, or investigative commissions.
Until a coherent and substantiated account is provided, the public will continue waiting for explanations that clarify rather than obscure, and that signal a genuine turning point towards a more accountable and constructive path forward.
Gibson Mulokozi is an agronomist and trained project manager with over four years of experience in social research, monitoring & evaluation and marketing. He is available at gibsongibs93@gmail.com. These are the writer’s own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoints of The Chanzo. Do you want to publish in this space? Contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com for further inquiries.
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