After eight months of behind-the-scenes talks and negotiations, the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and ACT Wazalendo (Zanzibar) have signed a new reconciliation accord dubbed Tamko la Pamoja (Joint Accord) in Zanzibar.
On the surface, this latest agreement is a welcome political development. Zanzibar has had a turbulent political history, marked by electoral contestation and the politics of identity that have shaped party and societal relations.
Over the years, these political tensions have led to violence, annulled elections, and boycotted elections – memories that continue to shape the Isles. However, there have been efforts toward peace and reconciliation, beginning with Muafaka I in 1999, brokered by the Commonwealth following the disputed 1995 elections.
Since then, every election has been accompanied by reconciliation agreements aimed at reforming electoral and governance structures and reducing political tensions. For instance, Muafaka II, which was reached in 2001, was premised on institutional reforms and electoral accountability.
The Maridhiano Agreement of 2010 was the culmination of localised mediation efforts that led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU).
READ MORE: Maridhiano at 15: Rekindling the Spirit of Reconciliation in Zanzibar’s Politics
Following the 2015 elections, the Maridhiano Agreement was effectively dead when the Civic United Front (CUF), then led by Maalim Seif Shariff Hamad, boycotted the 2016 repeat elections after the controversial annulment of the 2015 polls.
In the 2020 election, which was marred by violence, Maalim Seif Hamad, now with a new political outfit, ACT Wazalendo, hesitated to join the GNU, but after months of negotiations and demands centred on compensation for election victims and electoral reforms, among other issues.
2025 elections
Fast forward to the 2025 elections. The Maridhiano spirit going into the 2025 elections was virtually dead. Maalim Seif Sharrif Hamad, the iconic figure of reconciliation, died in 2021, and Othman Masoud replaced him as the First Vice President.
CCM won the 2025 elections, but yet again, the opposition ACT Wazalendo cried foul, saying that the polls were not free and fair.
Despite having the constitutional requisite vote share to join the GNU, ACT Wazalendo chose to go on a soul-searching mission to reflect on its future in the GNU.
The accord signed on July 9, 2026, has been represented as an effort to strengthen unity, political tolerance, and lasting peace in the Isles. President Samia Suluhu Hassan’s presence at the signing ceremony was symbolic, giving the event national political weight that will be read beyond Zanzibar.
READ MORE: Zanzibaris Split Over Whether GNU Has Improved Matters Or Not
Zanzibar and its people deserve political harmony after decades of animosity and tension. Elections in Zanzibar go beyond the electoral contests. They are avenues for historical grievances and memory, and for identity anxieties played out by the two main political parties – CCM and ACT Wazalendo (and previously CUF).
The history of reconciliation, therefore, carries deep moral and political significance, as witnessed at the signing of the new accord. Throughout the years, the reconciliation agreements have acted as pathways for national healing.
Why reconciliations fail
However, lessons from past reconciliation accords have also taught us that reconciliation is not linear and, as Othman Masoud pointed out in his speech at the signing, there are elements in certain quarters that don’t favour reconciliation. The July 9 accord raises another critical question – why do reconciliation agreements fail to last?
Zanzibar has been down this road before. The language of Maridhiano has been central in the Isles’ post-1995 political evolution. The rhetoric of reconciliation has always been an effort for lasting peace. However, beyond the elite pacts, reconciliations seem not to have been fully translated into societal benefits.
Each time, reconciliation has been presented as a bridge to peace and harmony. However, each time, the deeper structures of Zanzibar’s political problems remain unresolved.
The paradox of these processes is that they remain largely about position-sharing rather than power-sharing. These processes have created elite accommodation that does not translate into sustained electoral and governance reforms or democratic accountability.
READ MORE: Will GNU Survive Ongoing CCM, ACT-Wazalendo Wrangling?
The framework of the GNU, as agreed in 2010, provides for power sharing. Under this framework, the winner of the presidential elections becomes the President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.
The position of First Vice President goes to the party that comes second in the elections, and the position of Second Vice President goes to the party that wins the presidency. However, the First Vice President has remained largely a symbolic and ceremonial figure with very little political weight and is often sidelined by the CCM system.
In my earlier academic work on Zanzibar, I described this as a politics of continuity and collusion. Reconciliation, in this sense, does not necessarily disrupt domination; it can stabilise it. It can create the appearance of inclusion while preserving the architecture of ruling-party control.
This does not mean opposition actors who enter reconciliation are naïve or complicit in a simplistic sense. Often, they face impossible choices. They must choose between refusing to engage and being accused of endangering peace or entering into dialogue and being accused of legitimising an unfair political order.
Speaking at the signing ceremony, Othman Masoud reiterated this dilemma. On the one hand, he understands that entering into the GNU through the new accord creates political space, reduces tensions, protects supporters, and keeps alive the possibility of further reforms.
However, Masoud and ACT Wazalendo also understand that this has become a familiar cycle, captured by the Swahili idiom funika kombe mwanaharamu apite.
In the last GNU (2020-2025), as First Vice President, Othman Masoud positioned himself as both a participant in government and a critic of its failures. That was not an easy balance.
In Zanzibar, opposition politics has always required navigating between moral resistance and pragmatic survival. To reject reconciliation outright may be politically costly; to embrace it too fully may be morally risky.
The success of this joint accord lies in CCM’s commitment and sincerity. President Hussein Mwinyi, who is in his last term, has pledged his commitment and goodwill. This can only be translated into credible electoral reforms and political tolerance. Most crucial will be the efforts on the question of justice, institutional reforms, and governance.
Lessons for Mainland?
President Samia’s presence at the signing also raises a broader national question. Can Zanzibar serve as a laboratory for Tanzania’s broader reconciliation politics?
Since she came to power, Samia has spoken the language of reconciliation, reform, and political tolerance. Yet the Mainland continues to experience political stalemate and tensions.
The Zanzibar accord may therefore be more than an Isles matter. It may signal a broader strategy by the CCM administration to enter reconciliation talks on the mainland.
Dr Nicodemus Minde researches the contested memories of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union, the dynamics of Zanzibari nationalism, and the complex pathways toward reconciliation in the archipelago. He’s available at nminde96@gmail.com or on X as @decolanga. These are the writer’s own opinions and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of The Chanzo. Want to publish in this space? Contact our editors at editor@thechanzo.com for further inquiries.
